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Abstract: 
 
It is important to make explicit the theoretical framework within which research is conducted 
because one's choice of theory constrains the choice of what to study and which methods to use 
for doing research. From a perspective informed by the writings of T. Kuhn (1962), S. C. Pepper 
(1942), and L. T. Winegar (1997), the author assessed the extent to which each of the articles in 
this special issue related theory to methods and to analysis. The author identified limitations in 
each of the articles, caused primarily by the use of methods or analyses that did not seem well 
suited to the theory of choice. However, each of the articles also had great strengths, and, taken 
together, they further our understanding of the complexity of the relationships between peer 
collaboration and cognitive development. They also provide some stimulating and productive 
ways of studying the collaborative processes themselves. 
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Article: 
 
Angela O’Donnell, in her overview of this special issue, wrote, “The objective of this special 
issue is to illustrate how the theoretical framework one adopts with respect to understanding peer 
learning and collaboration has crucial influences on what is studied and how” (p. 3). John 
Richters (1997), in a provocative and insightful article, used the Hubble telescope as a metaphor 
with which to castigate psychology for being insufficiently concerned with conducting research 
in which the theory being espoused has clear links both to the methods being used to collect data 
and to the ways in which the data are analyzed. O’Donnell’s is thus a timely call for a greater 
concern for theoretical, methodological, and analytic consistency. My feeling is that, unlike in 
real life, the marriage of incompatibles should be immediate grounds for divorce. 
 
Why is there such a concern? As early as the 1920s, Vygotsky realized that the development of 
new theories in psychology required the development of new methods. The reason is that 
theories have links to different conceptions of the world, the way the world works, and how to 
understand that world-in short, different worldviews or paradigms (T. Kuhn, 1962). That 
discussion, at least in terms of its impact on psychology, can be traced back to the work of 
Pepper (1942), who described four “world hypotheses”—formism, organicism, mechanism, and 
contextualism—that deal with scholarly approaches to knowledge. Each of these positions comes 
with its metaphor for how development occurs, such as the holistic unity of the developing 
organism or the mechanism of a watch. 
 
In the United States for the second half of the 20th century, greatest interest was shown in the 
worldviews of organicism and mechanism, corresponding to the theories of Piaget on the one 
hand and behaviorism and social learning theory on the other. Deanna Kuhn (1978), for example, 
focused exclusively on organismic and mechanistic approaches to the discipline when asking 
whether there was one psychology or two. Overton (1 984) questioned whether those two 
approaches “provide the only possible basis for research programs in psychology” and answered 
“no” to that question. However, he went on to argue that neither formism nor contextualism 
could “form the basis for a scientifically viable research program” (1984, p. 217). By contrast, 
Altman and Rogoff (1987) argued that each worldview has its corresponding domain in 
psychology. They linked formism (renamed a “trait” worldview) to the theories of Freud and 
Erikson and contextualism (renamed a “transactional” worldview) to Gibson’s ecological theory 
and to Vygotsky. Moreover, Altman and Rogoff pointed to the different units of analysis, 
approaches to causation and development, views on the nature of the observer-observed 
relationship, and the foci of study associated with each worldview. 
 
Recently, Guba and Lincoln (1994) argued that “questions of method are secondary to questions 
of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the 
investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically 
fundamental ways” (p. 105). They examined the ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
associated with positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism. Those whose 
worldview is positivist or postpositivist believe that reality is essentially real and knowable, 
albeit probabilistically knowable from a postpositivist perspective. By contrast, critical theory 
ontology holds that what counts as “reality” is “shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, 
ethnic, and gender values; crystallized over time” (Guba & Lincoln, p. 109). What Guba and 
Lincoln call constructivist ontology is associated with the view that reality is relative, related to 
the specifics of the context. 
 
Guba and Lincoln described similar differences of epistemology, in which positivist and 
postpositivist worldviews hold an essentially dualist and objectivist position on knowledge, 
whereas critical theory and constructivist positions on epistemology hold that research findings 
are necessarily subjective, mediated by one’s values or coconstructed by the researcher and the 
participants in that research. Those alternative views on the nature of reality and how one can 
know that reality are reflected in the types of methods favored by researchers who hold those 
different worldviews. According to Guba and Lincoln, positivist and postpositivist researchers 
rely on methods that are essentially experimental and manipulative in an attempt to falsify 
hypotheses. By contrast, researchers whose worldviews are critical theoretical or constructivist 
use methods that are dialogical, hermeneutic, or dialectical. The aims of positivist and 
postpositivist researchers are those of explanation, prediction, and control, whereas the aims of 
critical theory and constructivist researchers have more to do with arriving at greater 
understanding, both for researcher and participants, so that reconstruction and emancipation 
might follow. Goldhaber (2000) made essentially the same argument in his discussion of 
Pepper’s (1942) mechanistic, organismic, and contextualist worldviews and argued that the 
methods and analytic techniques relevant to a theory that fits within one of these paradigms are 
inappropriate for use by those whose work falls within a different theoretical perspective. 
 
It seems clear, therefore, that the worldview that one adopts has enormous implications for one’s 
notion of reality, the type of theory that one finds appealing, the methods one uses, the way in 
which one analyzes and interprets the data, and so on. Not surprisingly, discussions of 
methodological and analytical differences cannot make much headway until differences at the 
paradigmatic and theoretical levels have been clarified. A good case in point is that of Piaget, 
whose constructivist approach was reflected in a “clinical method” that used talking with and 
questioning children as a way of uncovering their understanding of reality. By contrast, many of 
his North American critics used methods stemming from a positivist worldview to try to 
“disprove” Piaget’s theory (Goldhaber, 2000). 
 
From my perspective, the most helpful approach to these issues is Winegar’s (1997) discussion. 
His position is that the term research should be considered more broadly as the focus on multiple 
interrelated levels, including metatheory (similar to paradigm or worldview), theory, 
methodology, method, analyses, and data. First should come the explicit focus on metatheory: 
 
It is my position that any scientific practice will be more successful if its practitioners 
direct at least some of their energy toward the explicit consideration of metatheory, rather 
than letting such assumptions remain solely implicit as the unreflective consequences of 
particular practices. (1997, p. 14) 
 
Given the previous discussion of worldviews, it is not surprising that Winegar argued that 
metatheoretical predilections constrain the choice of theory that one finds satisfying. A 
metatheoretical view that holds that reality is essentially knowable in the course of careful 
experimental control and manipulation would not set well with a theory that sees bidirectional 
influences between researcher and participants. 
 
Perhaps the most important distinction drawn by Winegar is between methodology and method. 
Winegar, drawing on Danziger (1988), argued that the former term should be reserved for the 
explicit consideration of the types of methods that need to be used given the theory of choice: 
 
That is, methodology operates within metatheoretical assumptions about both the 
phenomenon of interest and the nature of theories appropriate to the study of such a 
phenomenon. . . . Rules of practice of methodology include faithfulness of articulation 
between theory and phenomenon and elegance in translating theory-phenomenon into a 
particular investigative method. (1997, p. 21) 
 
In other words, when O’Donnell laid out her objectives for this special issue, she was essentially 
thinking methodologically, focusing on the relations between the theory these authors were using 
on the one hand and the methods they were therefore constrained to use, on the other hand. That 
is precisely what Winegar is calling for—an explicit link between theory, method, and analyses. 
 
Commentary 
 
With this discussion of the links between metatheory, theory, methods, and analysis behind us, I 
turn to the five substantive articles in this issue. However, before proceeding I should, in keeping 
with Winegar’s suggestion, make explicit my own metatheoretical position. I subscribe to a 
constructivist (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) or transactional (Altman & Rogoff, 1987) worldview, and 
the theories in which I have set most of my recent work are sociocultural and ecological (see, 
e.g., Hogan & Tudge, 1999; Tudge, 1992, 1997; Tudge, Hogan, & Etz, 1999; Tudge, Putnam, & 
Valsiner, 1996; Tudge & Scrimsher, under review). This theoretical framework clearly has 
implications for the types of methods I view as important and the types of analyses I think are 
most relevant to those methods. I hope that my bias in this regard still allows me to evaluate the 
extent to which alternative methods and analytical strategies are appropriate to other theories, 
based on other paradigms. Having said this, my first goal is to examine the fit between theory, 
method, and analysis in each of these articles. My second goal relates to the extent to which our 
understanding of peer collaboration has been enhanced by these articles. 
 
Theory 
 
What are the theoretical frameworks adopted by these authors, and what are the implications for 
the methods that were used? Two of the articles were set within a constructivist perspective that 
derives from Piaget. Golbeck and Sinagra clearly referred to the theory they used to frame their 
research: 
 
From a Piagetian constructivist perspective, the symmetrical nature of peer relationships 
presents an ideal context for promoting the development of thinking. Peer interactions 
offer a context for the disequilibration of thought, the search for logical coherence, and 
the transformation of ideas leading to new understanding or development. (p. 22) 
 
As they pointed out, research on collaboration set within a Piagetian perspective has focused on 
peer interaction rather than adult-child pairings, a view consistent with Piaget’s views on the 
relative merit of the former for cognitive development. 
 
Samaha and De Lisi also focused on peer collaboration (as opposed to peer tutoring) involving 
peers of equal status rather than partners who have different levels of competence. This view of 
peer collaboration “seems to be more illustrative of Piaget’s (1932, 1970) view of social 
interaction than of Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development” (p. 2). Rather than 
elaborating on the theoretical foundation of their work, they set their research within the context 
of other recent studies of peer collaboration requiring formal reasoning, spatial perspective, 
balance scale tasks, reading, and math. As they pointed out, the authors of much prior research 
have examined the active nature of the reasoning among peers, implying a discrepancy in ideas 
and an interest in engaging with partners to resolve those differences. Though Samaha and De 
Lisi did not relate those ideas directly to Piaget, that approach to collaboration accords well with 
his view of disequilibration and its cognitive resolution. Essentially, their goal was to assess the 
extent to which collaboration among peers would lead to improvement in reasoning. Moreover, 
because the literature had suggested differential effects for male and female students, Samaha 
and De Lisi wanted to know whether gender played a significant role. 
 
Van Boxtel, van der Linden, and Kanselaar discussed differences between cognitive 
constructivist (individualistic) and sociocultural perspectives (viewed as related to social 
processes) on collaborative problem solving, and although they did not cite Vygotsky directly, 
the sources linked to the sociocultural perspective have been influenced by Vygotsky. The 
cognitive constructivist perspective was derived from an information-processing paradigm that 
focuses on “individual cognitive activities and development and stresses the need for 
elaboration” (p. 57). Their research, however, was set within a sociocultural framework, with a 
focus on the negotiation and coconstruction of meaning. That coconstruction is not simply the 
construction between partners, but between partners and a mediational tool—a textbook. The 
authors did not view the outcome as elaboration and learning, but rather as an appropriation 
resulting from engagement in shared activity. 
 
Hmelo, Nagarajan, and Day also described themselves as being influenced by sociocultural 
theory. They wanted to describe the ways in which knowledge “is constructed by group members 
as they interact with each other and with cultural artifacts” (p. 37) and were interested in 
understanding how “learning involves mediated action in a context” (p. 37). Hmelo and her 
colleagues were also interested in seeing the ways in which an adult “facilitator” might be used 
and might help the group members. 
 
Chinn, O’Donnell, and Jinks were not explicit about the theory that informed their research and 
in fact framed their research as an investigation of ways of analyzing the quality of group 
interactions that combine approaches from sociolinguistics and from peer learning. The authors’ 
focus was on the structure of peer discourse rather than on the effects of conflict and its 
resolution (the emphasis of the other articles in this special issue). Chinn and his colleagues were 
the only authors to relate their work to a broader metatheoretical level (argumentation in 
science), but the research itself does not seem to be guided by any specific theoretical 
framework. 
 
Method 
 
All of the studies reported in these articles were well conceived, designed, and carried out. Given 
my earlier discussion of Pepper (1942) and Winegar (1997), however, my interest was in 
examining the extent to which the methods fit well with the theoretical foundation of each study, 
rather than commenting on the details of the methods themselves. In the case of Golbeck and 
Sinagra, the task itself was Piagetian, and a good deal of Piaget-inspired research has used 
similar methods. The participants were tested individually; they then worked again on the 
problem, with access to containers half-filled with liquid so that they could be actively involved 
with the objects rather than simply working at the abstract level. Some of the participants worked 
individually, whereas others worked as pairs. Finally, the participants were tested again to 
ascertain the extent of improvement. One problem in the design, from a Piagetian point of view, 
is that it is not clear whether quantitative changes in degree of horizontality constitutes a 
developmental change, which would be more easily shown by qualitative change. A second 
problem is that although Piaget indeed argued that peer interaction is likely to be more effective 
in bringing about cognitive development than adult-child interaction, its effectiveness is not the 
result simply of equality of status. It stems from the fact that children of equal status are free to 
argue with one another and, potentially at least, therefore experience cognitive conflict and the 
cognitive restructuring associated with development. Without differences in ideas, there can be 
no cognitive conflict, and therefore no possibility of restructuring. Golbeck and Sinagra’s design, 
it seems to me, would have been closer to a Piagetian design if it had encouraged some degree of 
cognitive conflict, for example, by consciously pairing participants whose pretest thinking on 
horizontality differed. Nonetheless, one might expect that some of the pairs would have differing 
ideas and that therefore cognitive conflict would be generated. 
 
Samaha and De Lisi also used a three-part design, consisting of pretest, experimental phase, and 
posttest, and, like Golbeck and Sinagra, they conducted the entire study within a single day. Four 
groups were created for the experimental phase, allowing for a control group that was tested 
individually and three groups of 4 or 5 children (male, female, and mixed-gender groups). The 
groups were asked to reach consensus and then to write, individually, their justifications for the 
group’s selection. The members of the control group, tested individually, were provided 
feedback. Again, the authors made no attempt to ensure that cognitive conflict would be created 
by grouping children who, at pretest, had shown different abilities. However, given the nature of 
the problems, differences in judgment and reasoning might have been expected. As was true for 
Golbeck and Sinagra’s research, it is not clear to me that Samaha and De Lisi’s outcome 
measures captured development in the sense that Piaget used that term. 
 
Van Boxtel and her colleagues also used a three-part design, although that design differed from 
those of the first two studies in a number of ways. First, the time between the phases was far 
greater; the pretest and experimental phases were separated by 3 weeks, and the posttest took 
place 1 week after the experimental phase. This design also did not feature a control group of 
students tested individually—all participants were paired, virtually all as same-gender dyads. 
The authors were interested in the learning of concepts related to electricity, and they were 
mainly interested in what occurred in the collaborative session—particularly the use of a 
mediational device, a textbook. This design is most clearly relevant to sociocultural theory, in 
which one would expect cultural tools to play a significant role. Moreover, unlike in Piagetian 
theory, in which development should be shown by qualitative change, the quantitative changes 
that van Boxtel and her colleagues measured seem more appropriate, particularly given the 
longer intervals between sessions. 
 
Hmelo, Nagarajan, and Day’s study was different in that it focused almost exclusively on what 
happened during the group session. Of the two groups selected for comparison, one had scored 
low initially (on average), whereas the other had scored high. Given that the authors had based 
their research on a sociocultural foundation, the decision to examine simply the group session 
makes sense. The focus on the group’s use of a cultural tool (a computer) also fits nicely on a 
sociocultural foundation, as does the use of a more competent other (the facilitator). On the other 
hand, the study (like that of van Boxtel et al.) did not seem designed to allow more competent 
and less competent students to work together, which would have been a design characteristic 
more representative of a sociocultural perspective. 
 
The research reported by Chinn, O’Donnell, and Jinks was part of a larger study encompassing 
five sessions, although this article focused on group discussions during the second session. The 
design allowed for analysis of individual conclusions drawn by the students as well as the 
groups’ discussion of conclusions supposedly written by other children of the same age. The 
design allowed scores on their individual conclusions to be related to the quality of their group 
discussion. Chinn and his colleagues did not set their research within any specifiable theory, 
however, which makes it difficult to say whether there was a connection between theory and 
method. 
 
Analysis 
 
In keeping with the goals of this commentary, I must consider what would count as an analytic 
technique relevant to one theory or another. Goldhaber (2000) discussed this issue well, linking 
analysis of variance and regression analysis (useful for assessing the effects of independent 
variables) to theories stemming from a positivist or mechanistic worldview; clinical interviewing 
and pattern analyses to theories (such as Piaget’s) that fit within an organismic worldview; and 
ethnography and discourse analysis to contextualist theories such as Vygotsky’s. 
 
Although Golbeck and Sinagra’s article is framed in Piaget’s theory, and the task and design are 
nicely linked to the theory, the analyses are purely positivist and do not seem well related to 
Piagetian theory. The authors used a traditional analysis that treats each participant as the unit of 
analysis, ignoring what actually occurred in any specific dyadic discussion. One problem, from a 
theoretical point of view, is that the analyses do not allow us to know the extent to which either 
cognitive conflict or its resolution was implicated in cognitive development. A more appropriate 
analysis would presumably have been one in which dyads that featured cognitive conflict and its 
resolution could have been distinguished from dyads in which there was either no conflict or 
conflict but no resolution. In other words, the one thing that is key to this part of Piaget’s theory 
(the fact of cognitive conflict and its resolution in discussion) is lost from sight. Raising 
interesting points, gesturing, talking about the water level in relation to the external environment, 
and so forth, might all be important aspects of the task, but it is unclear whether these issues 
were raised by one partner for the benefit of another, were raised by one person in cognitive 
conflict with his or her own expectations, were raised by someone’s partner and then simply 
imitated (as Bandura might have suggested), or what. 
 
The same issues are apparent in Samaha and De Lisi’s article. There is no obvious way in which 
the analyses they conducted are related to Piaget’s theory. Their analyses also involved a 
repeated measures analysis of variance that treated the individual as the unit of analysis, thus 
effectively preventing the authors from analyzing statistically the very things that were of 
interest (theoretically speaking). In all groups but the all-female group, clear improvement 
occurred during the experimental phase (but not at the posttest) in the judgment scores, and all 
groups improved during both the experimental phase and the posttest for the explanation scores. 
Unfortunately, we do not know why there was that pattern of improvement. It might have been 
because more competent members of each group simply demonstrated better responses that were 
then imitated. It might have been that less competent members of each group came to understand 
better under the guidance of one or more competent members. It might have been that cognitive 
conflict was generated and then resolved within some groups and not in others. In other words, 
the analyses could equally well support Bandura’s, Vygotsky’s, or Piaget’s theory, although the 
authors believe that their findings support “versions of social constructivism based on Piagetian 
theory” (p. 19). 
 
Van Boxtel and her colleagues used analyses similar to those reported by the other authors—
namely, analysis of covariance and paired t tests, with the individual as the unit of analysis. 
Those analyses do not seem at all appropriate for sociocultural theory. However, the authors also 
go into a good deal of detail in their discussion of dyadic interaction in the course of using a 
textbook to assist them. In this case, the qualitative analyses are highly appropriate to the 
theoretical framework being used, showing the coconstmctive processes occurring in one dyad 
with and without the assistance of the cultural tool provided for that purpose—a textbook. The 
richness of this approach magnifies the limitations of the quantitative approach adopted, in which 
no account is taken of what occurred during the collaborative phase itself. 
 
Given Hmelo, Nagarajan, and Day’s goal of examining the ways in which a joint problem space 
is constructed, the qualitative analyses do an excellent job of showing the construction process 
and how that process differed in the two groups examined (initial low prior knowledge and initial 
high prior knowledge). From their base in sociocultural theory, the authors appropriately 
demonstrated the ways in which the computer tool and the human facilitator both helped to 
mediate the students’ discussions. Comparisons of ideas, negotiations, questions, suggestions, 
elaborations, and self-reflection can all be examined in the transcripts displayed and provide 
good indications of the coconstruction of knowledge. 
 
Chinn, O’Donnell, and Jinks’ analyses were also primarily qualitative, focusing on the structure 
of discussions with particular emphasis on the complexity of the structure. As is true of the 
article by Hmelo and her colleagues, those analyses allow for assessment of discussion at both 
the group and individual levels, so that it is possible not only to see what each group member 
adds to the discussion but also to derive measures of the complexity of the group as a whole. 
Chinn and colleagues then used those measures to assess “outcome” measures of the students’ 
individual postdiscussion conclusions. However, the subtlety of the more qualitative measures of 
discussion complexity was followed by correlational tests in which no account seems to have 
been taken of group membership and in which the individual was treated as the unit of analysis. 
 
Discussion 
 
I have been somewhat critical of these articles, but this is because I have held them to a standard 
typically not asked of most empirical reports—to show a close connection between theory, 
method, and analysis. I have done so partly because of my belief that such a connection is an 
important part of the research enterprise. But I was also interested in O’Donnell’s objective for 
this special issue, namely, “to illustrate how the theoretical framework one adopts . . . has crucial 
influences on what is studied and how” (O’Donnell, p. 3). Most of these articles, individually, 
fall short of meeting the objectives, but that may be a function of the fact that O’Donnell 
intended that the collection of articles as a whole would illustrate the objective. In fact, I was 
interested to note that there was a good deal of uniformity in the ways in which the data were 
analyzed. All authors provided some fairly traditional (positivist) analyses that did not seem 
appropriate to the theories on which the research was based as well as some very interesting 
qualitative analyses that focused on the processes of collaboration. I am not convinced, however, 
that one could examine any of the analyses and determine directly from them the theoretical 
foundation of the study. That was not true of the methods themselves; the two Piaget-based 
studies focused exclusively on peer collaboration, whereas the two studies based on sociocultural 
theory examined not only collaborative partners but also aspects of appropriate cultural artifacts 
as well as the role of the more competent adult. 
 
Moreover, all of the articles succeeded in broadening our understanding of the effects of peer 
collaboration on cognitive development. I discuss those benefits from the perspective of one of 
my metatheoretical presuppositions—namely, that to understand development one must consider 
the interrelations among interpersonal, individual, and contextual factors. 
 
The Interpersonal Level 
 
At the interpersonal level, most of the articles provide wonderful evidence for why it is so 
helpful to examine the processes of interaction that take place during peer collaboration. It must 
be clear to all researchers in this area that studies that only discuss the results of collaboration tell 
us nothing about the mechanisms involved (collaborative processes) that might explain those 
results. By contrast, these authors focus primarily on the mechanisms, particularly at the level of 
discourse. 
 
For example, Hmelo and her colleagues examined the ways in which joint problem spaces were 
created in the course of discussion. Chinn and his colleagues illustrated the benefits of examining 
the complexity of the argumentation structure itself. Their analyses clearly show how greater 
collaborative argument complexity is linked to posttest gains and that elaboration might be the 
key. Providing relatively simple points in support of or critical of a partner’s argument was not 
as helpful as going beyond what a partner had said, adding elements from one’s own thinking. 
That linked nicely with Hmelo et al.’s discussion of evaluative and interpretive statements. Van 
Boxtel and her colleagues also showed the ways in which simple reading from the text was far 
less helpful than elaborating on the information that was gained. 
 
By contrast, it is noteworthy that Golbeck and Sinagra found (or at least reported) very little 
evidence of cognitive conflict, let alone complex argumentation or elaboration of ideas, and 
perhaps that helps to explain why there was no benefit gained from peer collaboration. Samaha 
and De Lisi, on the other hand, found that the students who had provided more sophisticated 
explanations during the collaborative sessions provided better explanations (although not 
judgments) at the posttest. 
 
In these articles, argument or sociocognitive conflict was less useful than the process of 
negotiation, of collaborating in such a way that joint agreement or intersubjectivity was attained. 
Goals had to be mutually agreed on and worked toward; however, Hmelo and her colleagues 
provided some excellent examples of students coconstructing their understanding of the problem 
in the course of discussion. The dyads discussed by van Boxtel and her colleagues also indicated 
that “engagement in each other’s ideas and reasoning” and building on the contributions 
provided by the partner was linked to cognitive gain (p. 71). Conflict by itself was of no value. 
 
The Individual Level 
 
However, to make sense of collaborative problem solving (the interpersonal level), one must take 
into account what each individual brings to bear on the situation. In some cases, it simply was 
not clear why some participants were more goal oriented than others, some more willing to 
collaborate and negotiate than others. However, Hmelo et al. noted clear differences in the ways 
in which members of the high-prior-knowledge group differed from those in the low-prior-
knowledge group. Specifically, the former referred more often to prior and conceptual 
knowledge when solving the problems, were more goal oriented, asked more questions, and 
made more evaluative statements. They were also far more likely than those with low prior 
knowledge to try explicitly to work on achieving consensus—all things that were related to task 
success. Clearly, their higher knowledge base meant that they were able to approach the 
problems and attempt to solve them in a way different from those who had less of a base to start 
from. Their findings relate nicely to those of Chinn and his colleagues, who found that 
individuals often benefited from the collaborative process, even if the reasoning used was 
constructed individually, without help from others in the group. Unfortunately, because Hmelo et 
al.’s groups were homogenous with respect to initial knowledge, it was not possible to determine 
the ways in which the students with more knowledge might have helped those with less 
knowledge. 
 
The studies reported by Golbeck and Sinagra and Samaha and De Lisi draw attention to a 
different personal characteristic-gender. Golbeck and Sinagra found, for example, that the 
women-only dyads did not benefit from collaboration (at least in terms of the task they were 
working on) as much as did the men-only dyads; women paired with men also did poorly. 
Women, in fact, performed better from pretest to posttest when working alone than when 
collaborating. Samaha and De Lisi, similarly, found that girls-only groups performed worse, at 
least in terms of judgments, than did boys-only groups during both the collaborative phase and at 
posttest. Both sets of authors noted that female students might have been more interested in 
establishing affiliative relations with their partners than in trying to solve the problem assigned. 
 
The Contextual Level 
 
It is thus clear that the personal characteristics that dyadic or group members bring with them to 
the collaborative sessions themselves are as important as what goes on between dyad or group 
members in the collaboration itself. The final factor is the contextual-by which I mean not only 
the proximal context of the setting itself but also the broader sociocultural context. For example, 
if it is the case that the different performance of the female participants in the studies just 
mentioned was due to their affiliative tendencies, it is only by reference to the sociocultural 
milieu that one can understand why that might be true. Change the broader cultural context, and 
there is no reason to expect the same type of differences (Tudge, 1989). It is hard to ignore the 
impact of context, as Golbeck and Sinagra noted when discussing male-female interactions that 
resulted in the female participant appearing uncomfortable. 
 
Samaha and De Lisi dealt with context in a different way. Having commented on the fact that 
“virtually all [research on peer collaboration] has been conducted with nondisadvantaged school 
children” (p. 7), they used a predominantly Hispanic and disadvantaged set of participants. They 
are to be commended for examining the effects of peer collaboration on groups that have been 
little studied, particularly as disadvantaged students may be less likely to be involved in 
cooperative groups in school than are those with more financial and social advantages. The 
results indicated that for the most part, peer collaboration was beneficial, but it would have been 
useful if the authors had indicated whether the degree of benefit from collaboration was similar 
to what would have been found among students from more advantaged groups. Research using 
the same method but a different population is needed if we are to know whether the effects of 
collaboration are similar for children from different cultural milieus. 
 
Several of the authors incorporated the sociocultural world explicitly in their research by the 
tools that they included to assist the collaborators. Hmelo and her colleagues, for example, noted 
that “computer tools provide opportunities to study the role that social factors and artifacts play 
in learning” (p. 37). Hmelo et al. showed the ways in which the computer helped to structure and 
guide the students’ thinking and also briefly discussed the role of the human guide (facilitator), 
representing the more competent social world, who also explained things if necessary. I would 
have liked to see some discussion of the fact that this task, a simulation of a clinical testing of an 
anticancer drug, had real-world significance, particularly to the medical students who were 
involved. The task contrasts with those more typically used in collaborative problem solving, in 
which there is a much less obvious reason to be motivated to solve the problem. Such a 
discussion would have allowed a better sense of the ways in which individual factors (prior 
knowledge and motivation) in conjunction with aspects of the sociocultural world (in terms both 
of tools and meaning) helped make sense of what occurred interpersonally. 
 
The work of van Boxtel and her colleagues is set within a sociocultural framework, and they 
pointed out that this framework “provides us with an understanding of concept learning as social 
and situated processes in which knowledge is coconstmcted and mediated by symbols and 
artifacts” (p. 58). In this case, however, what was interesting was the fact that the cultural tool 
that was used in the study (the textbook, potential source of cultural knowledge) was actually an 
impediment to learning, at least to many of the students. Although van Boxtel et al. did not write 
about it in these terms, their study was a nice illustration of the fact that from a Vygotskian 
perspective, internalization or appropriation is far more than a simple copying or imitation of 
some aspect of the world. Instead, it involves a process of making the information, skill, or 
concept one’s own, thereby transforming it in the process (depending on the individual’s past 
experience, knowledge, etc.). Although the group of dyads that had access to a textbook was not 
sufficiently distinguished in this way, I am confident that the dyads that did better were those 
who, like Aniek and Bregje, made the information their own in the course of elaborating on it. 
Students like Monique and Yvette, by contrast, who simply used the text as an “authority” and 
copied sentences without thinking or discussing them would not be expected to have made the 
information their own. In other words, they had not appropriated the information in the way in 
which Aniek and Bregje had. 
 
Taken as a set of articles, therefore, the research discussed here helps make clear that 
interpersonal, individual, and contextual factors must all be considered if we are to understand 
the relations between collaborative problem solving and cognitive development. This is a very 
worthwhile goal to have accomplished, and there should be no doubt that our understanding of 
these issues has been markedly increased. 
 
Is this sufficient? I think that O’Donnell’s overview raises an issue that may be more important-
to show the ways in which our theories influence what and how we study. Our field needs more 
theoretically driven research in which care is taken to match methods and analyses to the 
theoretical demands. In other words, I think that we need to spend more time undertaking what 
Winegar (1997) called the “methodological” work of the research process. To do otherwise is to 
fall prey to an empiricist stance in which variations in findings, no matter how interesting, cannot 
be related to each other in a coherent whole. What makes findings interesting is not simply 
whether they support or call into question results reported by other researchers. A whole variety 
of reasons could be held responsible-from variations of task to differences of age of participants. 
What surely matters is that patterns of similarities or differences in findings can be related to 
each other in some coherent manner. Coherence, as Winegar argued, is the realm of theory. 
 
If that is the case, why do we see so few published articles in which clear connections are drawn 
between theory, method, and analyses? Authors rarely make explicit their metatheoretical 
presuppositions, and the theoretical foundation of their studies often receives little more attention 
than a few citations of the theorist or theorists who have presumably been influential in the 
authors’ thinking. Is this because theory is considered unimportant? I think not. I think that there 
are two main reasons. First, graduate students in education, psychology, and child or human 
development are not encouraged to give more than cursory attention to issues of theory and the 
application of theory in methods and analysis. By contrast, far more attention is given to classes 
in research methods and statistical analyses. Second, the journals in which we write tend to the 
bimodal; they either allow a focus on matters of theory, with little or no space allowed for 
analyses of data (see, e.g., Human Development or New Ideas in Psychology), or encourage 
detailed discussion of methods and analyses but provide little encouragement for authors to go 
into theoretical depth. Moreover, the latter journals, focusing primarily on empirical work, are 
far more numerous, and the vast majority of the most prestigious journals come from their ranks. 
 
The authors of the five articles I have been discussing are to be commended for the fine work 
they have done increasing our understanding of the relations between collaboration and cognitive 
development. Moreover, they illustrate nicely the connection between theory and method; 
different theoretical perspectives do indeed lead scholars to approach the issue of collaboration 
differently. Perhaps it is time, however, to take more account of the fact that the statistical 
techniques that we are trained to use have implicit theoretical and methodological connections 
that may not fit with the theories or methods that we want to use. 
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